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   <title>PARAG KHANNA</title>
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   <updated>2010-03-12T01:57:48Z</updated>
   
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<entry>
   <title>Remapping the World</title>
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   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2010://1.189</id>
   
   <published>2010-03-12T01:52:23Z</published>
   <updated>2010-03-12T01:57:48Z</updated>
   
   <summary>TIME | March 12, 2010</summary>
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      <![CDATA[One of <em>TIME</em> magazine's "10 Ideas for the Next 10 Years"

By Parag Khanna]]>
      <![CDATA[Political borders remain among the most fundamental obstacles to human progress around the world. And yet while a borderless world could be a great thing, we can't assume it into being. We have to actually build it. Nothing would make a greater contribution toward removing justifications for armed conflict and toward economic development. In the next decade, drawing a new map of the world won't be just a worthy goal, it will become a moral, economic and strategic imperative. 

The notion of a borderless world seems chimerical. Even in a globalized age, 90% of the world's people will never leave the country in which they were born. For them, borders still matter greatly — and even violently. From the Israeli-Palestinian "fence" to the U.S.-Mexican border, demarcating, monitoring and defending borders is still the big business of the military-industrial complex. 

And yet, because we've been so focused on the inviolability of borders, we've neglected the fact that many of the very entities borders supposedly define were collapsing from within. Dozens of postcolonial states, from Congo to Pakistan, either don't really have or don't even deserve meaningful borders with their neighbors. And this has made long-standing dilemmas virtually intractable. 

Take the Middle East. Decades of diplomatic bickering and White House Rose Garden ceremonies haven't delivered Mideast stability, but an understanding about infrastructure might. One obstacle to the realization of a Palestinian state is the fact that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not connected. Investing in an arc of roads and commuter-rail lines linking the West Bank and Gaza — in addition to building modern air and seaports — would help a Palestinian state eventually sustain itself. Independence without infrastructure is futile. 

<img alt="ideas_century_0322.jpg" src="http://www.paragkhanna.com/ideas_century_0322.jpg" width="307" height="406" />

The Kurds know this, which is why they have been signing oil-exploration agreements with companies from Canada to Norway in preparation for the day the entity known as Iraq officially ceases to exist. If we replaced all the post-Ottoman political borders on our maps with lines representing the region's oil pipelines, we'd have a much more accurate picture of the vectors of influence and interdependence — and potential avenues for creating peace. Kurdistan would, after all, be landlocked; it has no choice but to get along with its neighbors if it wants to get the oil out. 

Similarly, why do we lazily accept the continuing existence of Sudan, a British colonial construct joining Arab Muslims and African Christians in Africa's second largest country, a place so large that three disconnected civil wars — in Darfur, South Sudan and the east — are raging at the same time? A more stable and peaceful arrangement for Sudan would be to focus on independence for Darfur and South Sudan sooner rather than later, allowing them to rebuild themselves as smaller states at peace with their neighbors instead of facing Khartoum's persistent and nefarious undermining from within. 

Beyond Sudan, Africa would benefit hugely from a reimagining of its current borders. Some innovative transborder ideas have emerged, such as sharing hydropower projects in the Great Lakes region or even establishing transboundary conservation parks, as South Africa is doing with its neighbors. Africa can become economically viable only if its plethora of puny economies merge from more than 50 into just a few. 

Leaders seeking to respond to the global economic and underemployment crises should take a lesson from the world's most successful instance of a subordination of arbitrary borders: the European Union. The E.U. is the world's most peaceful multinational zone and its largest economic bloc, combining 27 countries, 450 million people and a $20 trillion GDP. The solution to the hundreds of lines that scar our political geography is to physically build the lines that connect people across them. If we spend just 10% of what we do on fighting over and defending borders on transcending them, the next decade — and the decades beyond — will be better than the last. 

<a href="http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1971133_1971110_1971105,00.html">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Fly American - Unless You Know Better: Geopolitical Humor for the Oscars</title>
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   <published>2010-03-06T15:06:01Z</published>
   <updated>2010-03-06T15:12:19Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Washington Note | March 6, 2010</summary>
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      In &quot;Up in the Air,&quot; George Clooney portrays uber-frequent flier Ryan Bingham, who reaches ten million American Airlines miles--without ever leaving the United States. American Airlines is portrayed as the grand old silver lady of flying, and that&apos;s precisely the problem. It&apos;s certainly old, but far from grand. What does Clooney&apos;s Oscar hit have to do with U.S. foreign policy?


      <![CDATA[Most Americans simply don't realize just how "brand America" no longer carries much weight in the world unless you are looking for an iPhone or a Hollywood blockbuster. 

Our cars, political system, and economic practices have become a joke, and the Obama glow wore off before his administration's one-year mark. Our ignorance is best captured by the same American Airlines linked Mastercard's apparent policy to block usage of the card as soon as you commit the crime of trying to use it in a foreign country. Yet we still think we're the best because we don't know much about the rest.

American Airlines is a great metaphor for America itself. 

A recognizable brand that provides plenty of connections, but whose value and quality of service is greatly diminished. Its 757 planes rattle like roller-coasters, the in-flight entertainment system constantly conks out, and it's so loud in the cabin that Bose noise-cancelling headsets are no match. And try making a booking over the phone or online without the agent's keyboard freezing or system crashing.

Meanwhile, emerging market airlines from the UAE's Emirates and Etihad to India's Jet Airways are providing better services at lower prices. Their flight attendants dress in style, their food is hot, and they arrive on time. 

In Europe - yes, the same socialist sclerotic Europe conservatives love to bash - there are twice as many airlines as there are EU member countries. Following on the success of Ireland's Ryan Air, imitators galore have sprung up, driving more connections at lower costs. Most of the price of any flight within Europe is taxes that maintain first-rate infrastructure, not airfare. And you don't have to pay for peanuts.

One year into the Obama administration the very necessary debate about our national competitiveness is taking shape. We are falling behind in educating future innovators, meaning our economic edge is fading fast. In web-tech, we have Google, Amazon, and Twitter, but local preferences are gaining ground in Asia (a fact which lies at the heart of the Google vs. China face-off), where 4G speeds make American mobile operators look like the equivalent of a rotary dial. 

In bio-tech, we've ended Bush-era bans on stem-cell research, but new patents are pouring in from India and Korea where researchers are going after mainstream health problems and not just specialty drugs. And in clean-tech, save for some promising pockets of experimentation with electric cars and smart grids, we are the world's dirtiest per capita.

Globalization means that the gap between "Invented in America" and "Made in China" is shrinking rapidly. Technological know-how is spreading faster than ever--multinational corporations have to transfer the latest techniques and skills to foreign managers a condition of setting up shop overseas. It's no surprise that China just debuted the fastest inter-city bullet-train in the world just a few years after German industrial giant Siemens build China its first one.

Feel-good rhetoric can't reverse this greatest shift in geopolitical and geo-economic conditions: Globalization once extended America's edge, now globalization accelerates its undoing. America's share of the global economy is shrinking from close to an unnatural fifty percent at the end of World War II past the steady 25 percent mark held for about a decade towards a far more modest 20 percent. 

We are not a big enough market to set global standards--instead we're somewhere between Europe, which raises environmental and industrial quality control regulations, and China which undermines them.

If we want to re-capture global leadership for the sake of our economic competitiveness and national self-esteem, it starts by flying overseas and learning how the world's new markets live: what they drive (smaller and cleaner), what they eat (organic and with trans-fat optional), and what their values are (not church vs. state but rather a community-based politico-economic-spiritual synthesis).

Today there are probably several thousand young and unemployed American MBAs making that trip to the booming Persian Gulf emirates, India, China, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia and other emerging markets. 

Maintaining America's vaunted capacity for self-renewal hinges on them coming back with fresh ideas on how to make in America and sell in the rest of the world. Any American who can afford to should follow their lead. 

But start the trip right: don't fly American Airlines -- unless perhaps you are trying to get from Tulsa to Texas.

<a href="http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/03/fly_american_-/">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>The Taliban Are Here to Stay</title>
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   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2010://1.187</id>
   
   <published>2010-02-16T12:14:17Z</published>
   <updated>2010-02-16T12:21:54Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Daily Beast | February 16, 2010</summary>
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      Don’t be fooled into thinking the tide is turning with the Marja offensive. Parag Khanna and Melissa Payson on the years of political jawboning to come.
      <![CDATA[The coalition siege of Marja, as well as the capture of the Taliban’s top commander and recent Pakistani military incursions into South Waziristan, give the impression of a turning tide in the battle against the Taliban and victory around the corner. But neither the battlefield optics of “clearing and holding” terrain in Afghanistan’s countryside and villages nor the Obama administration’s silent decision to drop usage of the term “Af-Pak” can trump the region’s harsh realities. The only real solution to both nations’ existential crises is to engage directly in politics that are local, tribal, and perpetual. With the clock ticking rapidly for NATO to deliver stability in South Asia, success will depend on a paradigm shift in the West’s ability to grasp and act upon this.

First, the local. Both NATO forces and the Afghan government are meant to follow the current Marja battles with a governance strategy of winning over Taliban commanders and fighters and engaging villages in economic reconstruction projects. It’s too soon to tell whether this will even be possible given how much hinges on whether Afghan National Army forces can continue to hold territory after American and NATO troop withdrawals. And according to a recent investigative piece by Ron Moreau of Newsweek, the current operations, with the civilian death toll mounting, are more likely to harden resistance to both foreign occupation and the Afghan government than pave the way for local stability.

On the Pakistan side, a key ingredient of the Kerry-Lugar plan is the disbursal of $1.5 billion per year in non-military aid, making Pakistan the third-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world. But pouring more money into corrupt or defunct ministries won’t change Pakistan’s ground reality, where those dollars are needed most. And more American diplomats and contractors largely confined to an ever-expanding embassy compound or over-reliance on Western-garbed civil society actors hailing from urban centers won’t rein in Pakistan’s patronage system either. Indeed, such disconnected approaches risk a return to the unaccountable largesse of the 1980s, rather than prompting an innovative strategy to modernize Pakistan.

Instead, the U.S. and other major donors like the U.K. and European Union will have to forge ties with those dwelling outside their conventional reach. There is no excuse for missing this opportunity: From private schools teaching children computer skills to charitable health clinics to the Persian Gulf diaspora remitting money to their relatives, Pakistan’s indigenous civil society is in fact diverse, vibrant, and widespread. A close embrace of its members at the most local of levels must be a visible part of any partnership.

Engaging directly with the tribal population must be the second pillar in any partnership. In Afghanistan, the U.S.-supported Karzai regime has agreed to open a new political dialogue with Taliban elements aimed at determining a more formal role for their involvement in the country’s governance. In Marja, coalition leaders have already been meeting with tribal shura councils to assure them of the West’s commitment to tribal development. While varying from province to province, this initiative has to go forward at all costs in order to defuse the intractable hostility and stalemate between Western forces and the Taliban—an essential step if the Afghan National Army is ever to become a robust force and for NATO to ever leave the country.

Any effective strategy must acknowledge and integrate the permanent staying power and territorial legitimacy of the Pashtuns. Bureaucratic org-charts—even the nation-state system itself—can’t erase the nuances of tribal and clan relations that characterize the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan. So too with Balochistan and the Balochs in Pakistan’s southwest. The olden system of influential tribal elders, though battered in the Pashtun areas, has withstood the Taliban’s violent campaign to destroy and replace it with militant Islamic rule. No matter how tumultuous and intermittently brutal the situation, kinship networks and their leaders retain persuasive influence.

Regrettably, most officials and analysts fail to grasp that the Pashtun region is a potentially fruitful theater for dialogue and engagement. Its tribes have not only been fierce fighters for centuries, but also expert negotiators; they violently punish those who break promises, but honor agreements and loyalty as well. If the Obama strategy emphasizes “people-to-people ties,” these are the people who are crucial to enlist in both the short and long term. The tribal order can’t be defeated by fighting against it, but it can be gradually and incrementally modernized through thoughtful engagement. Many tribal leaders have appealed responsibly for just such an approach, including influential opinion-shapers in isolated North Waziristan. To turn away from this opportunity would be tragic.

Finally, we have to come to terms with the perpetual nature of negotiations with local and tribal populations. A longer time horizon can save us from repeating the mistakes of the past, such as focusing solely on military solutions and attempting to buy off capital elites. To avoid Afghanistan becoming another Vietnam, these will have to continue long after Obama has brought the troops home.



Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation and author of the international bestseller The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the 21st Century (Random House). He is a host of InnerView on MTV.

Melissa Payson has been designing, executing, and evaluating development programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2003.

<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-02-16/the-taliban-are-here-to-stay/full/">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>&quot;Iran als Testfall für Europas Außenpolitik&quot;</title>
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   <published>2010-01-28T20:07:29Z</published>
   <updated>2010-01-28T20:15:15Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Der Standard | January 27, 2010</summary>
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      STANDARD-Interview

US-Politologe Parag Khanna über eine Strategie für Afghanistan, den Umgang mit dem Iran und die Konkurrenz zwischen USA und China

Mit Khanna sprach in Davos Alexandra Föderl-Schmid.

      <![CDATA[
STANDARD: Was erwarten Sie von der Afghanistan-Konferenz?

Khanna: Sehr wenig. Man wird über Präsident Hamid Karsai und seine Zukunft reden. Dass er nicht einmal seine Minister durchsetzen kann, wird ein Thema sein. Aber da kann die internationale Gemeinschaft gar nichts machen. Keiner wird ihm sagen, dass er zurücktreten soll.

STANDARD: Mehr als 30.000 zusätzliche Soldaten werden nach Afghanistan verlegt, insgesamt sind dort nun mehr als 100.000. Wird das substanziell etwas ändern?

Khanna: Auf der einen Seite sagt man, die Taliban sind stärker denn je, haben Schatten-Gouverneure in jeder Provinz und können beliebig Bomben werfen. Andererseits können sie nicht regieren und genießen auch nicht überall die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung, auch wenn sie sehr präsent sind. Es ist natürlich eine Ironie, dass die Taliban mächtiger denn je sind, und ausgerechnet jetzt will man mit ihnen verhandeln.

STANDARD: Ist das klug?

Khanna: Die eigentliche Macht der Taliban ist sehr begrenzt. Sie können die Städte nicht kontrollieren, können nicht regieren. Insofern ist es klug, auch jetzt mit ihnen zu verhandeln. Die Bevölkerung will nicht wieder von den Taliban regiert werden. 30.000 Soldaten mehr heißt auch, dass der Kampf noch härter wird. Man hätte eigentlich schon früher verhandeln müssen, als sie noch schwächer waren. Das wäre klug, aber mit Bush nicht möglich gewesen.

STANDARD: Deutschland stockt sein Kontingent auf. Müssten die Europäer insgesamt noch mehr Truppen nach Afghanistan schicken? 

Khanna: Es wäre wichtiger, Wiederaufbauteams oder Polizei zu schicken. Italiener, Spanier, Deutsche sind vor Ort. Die sind aber mehr dafür bekannt, dass sie herumsitzen. Das habe ich selbst erlebt. Man könnte mit den Leuten, die da sind, schon mehr machen.

STANDARD: Zunehmend rückt der Fokus von Afghanistan nach Pakistan. Ist das aus US-Sicht nicht das weitaus größere Problem?

Khanna: Es ist nicht eine Frage der Priorität. Pakistan ist ein viel größeres Problem, eine Atommacht. Und die Probleme dort werden seit 30 Jahren unterschätzt. Die Amerikaner haben dort nie klug gehandelt. Die ganze Region wird destabilisiert. Präsident Pervez Musharraf ist überschätzt worden. Man hat immer darauf gesetzt, dass das Militär das Land im Griff hat. Das Militär kann das Land nicht mehr kontrollieren.

STANDARD: Wer dann?

Khanna: Man muss einen föderalen Rechtsstaat aufbauen. Darum muss sich die internationale Gemeinschaft kümmern.

STANDARD: Was passiert im Irak, nachdem sich die Amerikaner dort mehr und mehr zurückziehen?

Khanna: Der Irak bricht für mich unwiderruflich auseinander. In den nächsten fünf, sechs Jahren. In einen kurdischen Teil, der Rest des Landes wird im Bürgerkrieg versinken. Das ist für mich das wahrscheinlichste Szenario, sobald die USA wirklich weg sind.

STANDARD: Zum Thema Iran: In einem Bericht über ein Jahr Obama haben Sie geschrieben, dass die Iran-Politik für Sie der enttäuschendste Punkt war. Warum?

Khanna: Ich habe viel mehr erwartet. Nicht dass das Scheitern der Diplomatie nur Obama vorgeworfen werden soll. Natürlich nicht. Es hat eine Revolution im Iran gegeben, Ahmadi-Nejad ist aber immer noch da. An Obamas Stelle hätte ich eine andere Politik gemacht.

STANDARD: Eine stärkere Unterstützung des Widerstands?

Khanna: Teilweise. Aber Regimewechsel ist nicht das unmittelbare Ziel. Es gibt keine Garantie, dass ein Nachfolger nicht noch schlimmer wäre. Nötig wäre eine neue strukturelle Beziehung. Man hätte eine Pipeline-Politik verfolgen können. Ölankauf, Aufhebung der Sanktionen. Das hätte etwas bewirken können. Neues Denken ist nicht diskutiert worden im Weißen Haus.

STANDARD: Aber im Vergleich zu Bush hat Obama sogar die Hand ausgestreckt.

Khanna: Es ist nie die Hand ausgestreckt worden. Diese Geste hat es nicht gegeben nach der Ankündigung in seiner Antrittsrede.

STANDARD: Wird es schärfere Sanktionen geben?

Khanna: Das ist die offizielle Politik, dass die Sanktionen verstärkt werden. Aber das ist in den USA noch nicht durchgesetzt. Wenn ich Europäer wäre, würde ich Iran als Testfall für eine eigene Außenpolitik nehmen.

STANDARD: Die Europäer haben es während der Bush-Administration mit Verhandlungen versucht, aber auch nicht viel erreicht.

Khanna: Sie haben nicht mit den USA mitgemacht. Das ist etwas anderes. Den Iranern wirtschaftlich mehr anzubieten, das könnten derzeit die Europäer. Auch in den Fragen der Sicherheitsarchitektur: Man könnte versuchen, Saudi-Arabien, Israel und den Iran an einen Tisch zu bekommen. Obama hat es nicht versucht. Wer organisiert mehr Konferenzen als die Europäer?

STANDARD: Was erwarten Sie von der neuen EU-Außenministerin?

Khanna: Ich habe diese Woche in Brüssel mehrere EU-Kommissare getroffen, die von ihr inzwischen fast begeistert sind. Sie hat einen guten Start hingelegt und ihr Image verbessert.

STANDARD: Aber ist das aus Ihrer Sicht wirklich die starke Person, die auf der Weltbühne Europas Außenpolitik vertritt?

Khanna: Ich hätte Tony Blair als Präsident oder David Miliband oder Chris Patten genommen. Diese Personalentscheidung zeigt die Spießigkeit der Europäer, auch die Angst vor Stärke. Aber Hillary Clinton ist nicht viel besser als Ashton. Sie bringt nicht sehr viel.

STANDARD: China ist erstmals Exportweltmeister, hatte beim Klimagipfel die dominierende Rolle. Ist China die neue Supermacht?

Khanna: China arbeitet seit Jahren an dieser Strategie. Was macht eine Weltmacht aus? Wirtschaftliche Stärke und strategische. Die sogenannten Schurkenstaaten der USA sind die gleichen Staaten, die China wirtschaftlich, politisch und militärisch unterstützt. Das ist kein Zufall, sondern strategisches Handeln einer Weltmacht. Man sieht strategischen Ehrgeiz auch in der Raumfahrt.

STANDARD: China rüstet auch militärisch auf.

Khanna: Das sind sehr einschüchternde Tendenzen aus der Sicht der USA. Ich bin als Berater an vielen Diskussionen darüber in den USA beteiligt. Das ist ein ständiges Thema. Waffenträger, Raketenabwehrsysteme, der Aufbau von Raketen gegenüber von Taiwan, die Anwesenheit von Militärschiffen im südchinesischen Meer: Dazu kommt die Annäherung zwischen Japan und China. Immer wenn es Spannungen zwischen den USA und einem Alliierten gibt, kommen die Chinesen.

STANDARD: Wie sind die US-Reaktionen darauf?

Khanna: Es gibt eine Kombination militärischer Strategien: Eindämmung und Zusammenarbeit. Es werden diplomatische und Handelsbeziehungen gepflogen. Der Währungskurs ist auch ein großes Thema. Es gibt keine einheitliche US-Antwort darauf. 

STANDARD: Ex-Funktionäre der KP Chinas setzen sich für den Dissidenten Liu Xiaobo ein. Wird der Widerstand innerhalb Chinas stärker?

Khanna: Natürlich gibt es diese Strömungen, aber niemand weiß, wie mächtig die im Moment wirklich sind. Aber es gibt derzeit keine generelle Bedrohung der chinesischen Staatsmacht. Derzeit gibt es kein alternatives Modell. Daran wird sich auch nach einem Machtwechsel 2012 nichts ändern. Die Führung ist von keinem ernsthaft bedroht außer von sich selbst.

STANDARD: Wie sehen Sie den Streit zwischen China und Google um Internetzensur?

Khanna: Da geht es auch um die sinkenden Marktanteile von Google in China. Wer sich durchsetzt, ist nicht absehbar.

STANDARD: Österreich sitzt seit 1. 1. 2009 im UN-Sicherheitsrat. Haben Sie das wahrgenommen?

Khanna: Nein, aber das hat nichts mit Österreich zu tun. Warum sollte man überhaupt auf den Sicherheitsrat aufpassen? Das ist ein aussterbendes Gremium. 

Zur Person
Parag Khanna ist Experte für Geopolitik bei der New America Foundation, einem Thinktank in Washington. Khanna wurde 1977 in Indien geboren, ist US-Bürger und hat Barack Obamas Wahlkampfteam in außenpolitischen Fragen beraten. 2007 war er Berater des Pentagons im Irak und in Afghanistan. Er hat Bücher, unter anderem zu China, veröffentlicht. Das Magazin Esquire zählt Khanna zu den "75 einflussreichsten Menschen des 21. Jahrhunderts" . Er ist als Young Global Leader zum Weltwirtschaftsforum eingeladen worden.

<a href="http://derstandard.at/1263706135856/STANDARD-Interview-Iran-als-Testfall-fuer-Europas-Aussenpolitik">Link to article</a>
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<entry>
   <title>Obama&apos;s Arc of Crisis</title>
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   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2010://1.185</id>
   
   <published>2010-01-19T15:13:18Z</published>
   <updated>2010-01-19T15:34:44Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The Majalla | January 18, 2010</summary>
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      What was, what is, and what might be yet to come after Obama’s first year in office.

By Parag Khanna

The first year of Obama’s administration has passed so quickly that it would be unfair to focus only on reviewing the events of the past twelve months without examining with equal vigor the trends that Obama’s election and foreign policy have set in motion and scenarios for the year ahead.
      <![CDATA[At the outset, it is important to note that in a year which for Obama was equally marked by domestic and foreign policy crises—with issues like the economic recession blurring that divide—the U.S. did not take the course that many would have predicted: retrenchment. Instead, he made four major trips overseas, his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, seems to have spent as much time abroad as in Washington, and special envoys were appointed to focus round-the-clock on Palestine, Afghanistan-Pakistan, North Korea, and other hot-spots. 

Within Obama’s first one hundred days, he over-turned decades of American foreign policy which sought to identify and isolate so-called “rogue states” or “states of concern.” He reached out in a variety of ways to Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea and others, instigating a positive dynamic whose potential, though yet to be realized in any of these cases, holds promise for the future. Equally importantly, he set a new tone in relations with major powers, particularly Russia as it relates to arms control and China on re-balancing the global economy. This makes him the first American president to truly appreciate the reality of a multi-polar world and a geopolitical marketplace in which not even a superpower has enough leverage to isolate its enemies when other great powers can engage and provide them with diplomatic, financial, and military lifelines. Taken together, this shift in diplomatic mentality and tone was the main justification for Obama being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Ultimately, however, Obama will be judged on whether or not he is deserving of that prize on the basis of his handling of the arc of crisis stretching from the Near East to Central Asia. This is the region where American interests and the lives of its troops are continuously on the line.

Palestine

Palestine remains an ever-present thorn in the side of the White House. Already during the U.S. presidential campaign there were mixed signals over his position, with Hillary Clinton (who later became Secretary of State) signaling resolute commitment to Israel, and the Obama campaign sacking a prominent advisor for his non-governmental dialogues with Hamas. Several attempts at generating early momentum through Israeli-Palestinian summits were met with an icy reception as newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to punish Obama for his criticism of West Bank settlement expansion. Even when they finally met, it only served to highlight the divide between these historic allies.

One year on, there is less reason to be hopeful than in past years. A two-state solution has become the outcome most profess to want and few are working towards. No particular “road map” or “peace plan”—whether American, Saudi, or Israeli—stands out as having sufficiently broad appeal. Expressing pre-emptive frustration with the lack of American support for the Arab peace plan, Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal declared early this year, “We don’t want any new American plan from Obama. Just help us implement the existing ones.” George Mitchell, Obama’s special envoy for the conflict, continues in vain to do just that.

Then there is the question of what will it take to deliver a breakthrough in the coming year and beyond. First, there must be reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah rather than a counter-productive civil war across the two Bantustans of the West Bank and Gaza. Only then can the Palestinians regain negotiating strength vis-à-vis Israel. For its part, Israel is best served reining in its increasingly pugnacious settlers before they become a destabilizing force in Israel itself. That they support Netanyahu has created a deep rift between Israel’s stated policy and its actual practice, and the consequences could be severe for Israel as much as for the Palestinian territories. Foreign powers and donors then need to get on the same page. Egypt’s renewed role as a corridor and broker in Gaza must be used constructively to lift the territory from its chaotic, disheveled state towards investments in factories and the seaport. The so-called “arc” of road and rail infrastructure linking Gaza and the West Bank must vigorously move ahead, creating jobs and physically building Palestinian unity. Independence without infrastructure is futile.

Iraq

2009 will be remembered as the year that Afghanistan replaced Iraq in America’s geopolitical conscience, and yet in 2010 Iraq may remain as much a headache as ever. Even as the U.S. quickly draws down the number of troops active there, constant car bombings attributable to Sunni insurgent militias targeting the Shi’a led government, military and police of Nouri Al Maliki are indicative of how fragile the veneer of Iraqi democracy remains. Particularly the country’s election law, still biased against minorities and reinforcing the Maliki bloc and Maliki’s powers, remains contentious with no workable compromise in sight. There is good news in foreign investment moving ahead in the energy sector, but energy prices have fallen and Iraq remains some time away from operating at full capacity.

Even more fundamentally, that Iraq will remain a single, sovereign, unified state remains an open question. Federalism is of course preferred by the Arab Sunni and Shi’a populations, but the northern Kurds clearly have different ambitions. As one of their guerilla leaders, Jalal Talabani, transitions out of the national presidency, Kurdish calculations could shift even further in 2010. With the Kirkuk census postponed indefinitely, so too is genuine clarity as to what territories will actually constitute Iraq several years from now.

Given the Kurdistan Regional Government’s success in recruiting foreign investors, warming relations with its neighbors, especially Turkey, and serving as a willing host to residual U.S. forces, we can see where Kurdish plans are eventually, and justifiably, headed. Indeed, if Kurdistan can balance its landlocked geography with a stable role as an energy source for pipelines across Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, then all sides could benefit. But we can just as soon imagine that the vacuum left by the withdrawal o U.S. forces will gradually give way to a Saudi-Iranian, Sunni-Shi’a proxy war over the rump Iraq – with Iraq again being the loser.

Iran

Obama’s greatest personal disappointment with respect to his first year handling Mideast diplomacy must surely be Iran. The Islamic Republic, sometimes mentioned by name but always implied during Obama’s lofty campaign speeches, was meant to be the main thrust of his “open hand” foreign policy. Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, however, pushed both the country and Obama into a lurch. How could he extend a hand to a regime which rigged elections and so brutally cracked down on protestors led by a dignified opposition candidate? Furthermore, how to find a window and interlocutor in Iran in the midst of the most open confrontations within Iran’s otherwise labyrinth and opaque leadership since 1979?

And yet Obama made the right decision in two ways. He didn’t wag his finger at Iranian president Ahmadinejad, knowing too well that this would only bolster his anti-imperialist credentials on the Iranian street. But Obama also resumed the nuclear dialogue with Iran at the first decent moment, giving the green light to a face-to-face meeting between State Department veteran William Burns and Iranian negotiator Saad Jalili.

Nonetheless, revelations as to a third major nuclear reactor program and announcement of a dozen more planned facilities—the former as disturbing as the latter is farcical—now drive the options and possibilities for engagement with Iran more than any shift in American doctrine. Obama will largely be in reactive mode over the coming months: reactive to Iranian decisions, IAEA reports, and Israeli intimations. It may be up to the Iranian people, who continue to agitate daily while breaking through barricades in more visible clashes every few months, to change the internal dynamic which now stands in the way of external diplomacy.

“Af-Pak” or “Pak-Af”?

It is likely that no geopolitical hotspot will define Obama’s presidency like Afghanistan-Pakistan. Obama spent 2008 on the campaign and 2009 as president making South-Central Asia his war, and in 2010 we will all bear witness to the impact of strategies finally shaped over the past year. The surge of 30,000 troops, bringing the overall NATO total to over 100,000, will have precisely eighteen months to achieve marked progress in Afghanistan, as measured by training effective Afghan security and police forces, pushing the Taliban out of major urban centers across the country, and establishing sound provincial and district level governance.

Each of these goals is fraught with nearly insurmountable obstacles. The Afghan National Army remains a rag-tag force, riddled with ethnic tensions, poor training and equipment, frequent desertions and high turnover. Indeed, it remains unclear as to whether supporting such a long-term project of Afghan “national security” is at all in anyone’s interest, not least given its likely infeasibility. Co-opting and partnering with local community and tribal militias seems a sounder strategy given the social fragmentation of Afghan society and the tight deadlines NATO forces are working under. Secondly, two years is not a long time for the Taliban to wait in the mountains as they have been trained to do for decades. They could still overwhelm urban centers after Western forces withdraw just as they have almost effortlessly swarmed in and around under NATO’s very eyes in recent years. The strategy to reinforce sound local governance remains the best one, hopefully generating a momentum and stability which Afghans themselves will prize enough to want to fight off the Taliban. But it is by no means guaranteed that it can work as quickly as the Obama administration and American public would like.

Then there is the “Pak-Af” view, namely that nuclear-armed, over-populated, and strategically located Pakistan is the far more pressing regional crisis, and while any gains in Afghanistan will likely not resonate beyond the immediate region, failure in and of Pakistan may have global repercussions. America’s response to this, the Kerry-Lugar legislation offering $1.5 billion in annual non-military assistance, unfortunately carries many of the same flaws which characterized American assistance in the 1980s: pouring millions of dollars into ministries better skilled at hiding, squandering, and siphoning funds than using them for service delivery to the people. Ramping up America’s embassy in Islamabad to staff over 1,000 people also seems like a robust complement, but few if any of these Foreign Service officers and security personnel will have the requisite local knowledge to build leverage within the Pakistani establishment to ensure that the money is spent right.

There is positive potential in special envoy Richard Holbrooke’s convening of Afghan and Pakistani ministers in the areas of intelligence, border control, and economy, but ingrained strategic calculations continue to trump America’s hopes. Pakistan sees America’s withdrawal from the region as imminent, justifying its perennial pursuit of “strategic depth” in a weakened Afghanistan while also trumpeting inflated fears of a proxy struggle with India there as well. Still, the long-neglected regional approach, which encourages Indian development projects, Chinese natural resource investments, and Iranian gas pipelines, is the only strategy which can meaningfully embed both countries in a regional architecture that withstands America’s looming military exit. Landlocked regions cannot be occupied from afar forever.

Looking Back to Look Ahead

The entire Southwest Asia, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean region is becoming the geopolitical center of gravity. From nuclear proliferation to energy security to piracy, the main choke points, threats, risks, protagonists, antagonists, imperial forces and rising powers are all ever more present here.

What is the fate of America in this Greater Middle East? A worst-case scenario comes to mind not from an analysis of the past year, but rather from a powerful analogy a half-century old: the 1956 Suez Crisis. Then it was Britain and France, desperately clinging to influence in a decolonized region, who responded to Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal by plotting with Israel to invade the Sinai and restore European control over the canal’s operations. The U.S. responded by threatening to dump the Pound/Sterling, Saudi Arabia embargoed oil exports to Britain and France, and the United Nations launched its first major peacekeeping operation in the Sinai. The consequences were long-lasting: Britain was humiliated and never again projected significant military power overseas, France lost trust in its European and NATO allies and pursued its own nuclear weapons program (which then benefited Israel), and, lesser known, Canada changed its flag to the Maple Leaf to remove any symbols of association with British colonialism.

Could America’s Iraq blunder, heavy military footprint in the region, and waning diplomatic credibility combine into a perfect storm which leads to its eventual ejection? While small Persian Gulf states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates value America’s security umbrella vis-à-vis Iran, Saudi Arabia has increased its courting of India and China as strategic partners in the energy and military sectors. There is no immediate replacement for American hegemony in the Middle East, but most in the region would prefer to fumble along in their own affairs that continue under America’s gaze. Obama’s first year gives only faint hope that he can reverse that view – if indeed it is even desirable to do so.

<a href="http://www.majalla.com/en/cover_story/article14078.ece">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Tying the shoe down is just wrongfooting it</title>
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   <published>2009-12-08T12:40:40Z</published>
   <updated>2009-12-08T12:52:34Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Straits Times | December 8, 2009</summary>
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      By Cheong Suk-Wai

TABLE TALK WITH PARAG KHANNA

THERE is something to be said about pursuing a thought that seizes you, even if it takes you to the ends of the Earth. 

Just ask American foreign policy scholar Parag Khanna. In 2004, he first hit upon the idea of making a television series about emerging markets and how they were being riven apart internally by globalisation. Nobody took him up on it. 
      <![CDATA[Then in late 2005, he convinced American publisher Random House to stump up nearly $60,000 for him to trek through as many countries as he could, including Brazil, Tunisia and Kazakhstan. He roughed it out, slept in the back of cars in the boondocks, because he thought that was the best way to get to know the peoples in these countries. 

His nearly three-year global trot culminated in his first book, The Second World, which the New York Times Magazine called one of the best ideas of 2007. 

Dr Khanna, who is all of 32, can now 'concentrate on family life', as he puts it, with his wife, a Pakistani-born management consultant, and their seven-month-old daughter. They hope to move to Singapore one day so as to raise their child in 'a more people-friendly place'. 

Dr Khanna was born in Kanpur in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. His father was a Tata Group sales manager and his mother a computer scientist. The elder Khanna's job took the family to Dubai when Dr Khanna was a toddler. Then, when he was seven, his entire family emigrated to the United States. 

The alumnus of Georgetown University and the London School of Economics is now the director of global governance initiatives at the New America Foundation, a think-tank in Washington, DC. He is writing his second book - on how privately funded institutions such as the Gates Foundation are changing the way the world works. 

Here are his takes on why people should not be obsessed about, among other things, China overtaking the US: 

With the decline of Western powers, the shoe of power now seems to be on the other foot. How comfortable is that fit for East and West? 

That's a great question. You say the shoe is now on the other foot. But nothing happens immediately in geopolitics. This transition began in the 1960s with the rise of Japan, the European Union and the Asian tigers. Just because people are waking up today doesn't mean the shoe is now on the other foot. The shoe is constantly in the process of movement and changing feet. 

But doesn't China own the shoe, so to speak, more than the US today? 

Many people want to see China replace the United States or the East replace the West, and they believe that until that is complete, there is no transition (of power). That's nonsense. 

How so? 

We live in a very complicated world where Asia, Europe, the US and Brazil are powerful - all at the same time. The US is not going to disappear from the world scene anytime soon and China is not going to replace it. It may never happen and it does not need to happen. Asia is a world unto itself; more than half the world's population lives there. So people do not have to wait for China to become more influential than the US at, say, the United Nations or the World Bank. What matters is that Asians are now running their own affairs, from the Asian Development Bank to (perhaps one day) the Asian monetary fund. 

Will the decline of American power mean the decline of idealism? 

There is a synonymity between America and the notion of idealism in certain rhetorical strains that certain Americans believe and pursue. But I don't believe that. People like Professor Kishore Mahbubani (dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy) talk about Asian confidence, contentment and an Asian set of views on what constitutes harmony and focus. And a great many people point out that there is nothing less idealistic about Asians (compared to their Western counterparts). 

For so long there's been this idea that developing countries can only be truly successful if they are democratic. 

People have known for a long time that countries can succeed if they are not democratic. The question is: Can countries continue to succeed if they are not so? 

Can they? 

The American argument is that, no, they cannot succeed without democracy. Which is why (New York Times columnist) Thomas Friedman says that China is a smooth road with a cliff on the horizon while India is a bumpy road with a sunny horizon, because China is not a democracy. But I believe China, Singapore and Malaysia demonstrate that you can have sustained growth, stability and happiness without being democratic in the Western sense. Let's also bear in mind that democracy is now being replaced with the idea of good governance. 

But isn't good governance democracy by another name? 

No, it's a more scientific approach to creating a successful, balanced society, with elements of social stability and equity. These elements are not emphasised in the idea of democracy at all. 

Why is good governance better? 

Well, because it works. That is the true test of anything, and not its ideological status. If emerging market countries want to succeed, I believe that the model that they seek is not the US because that ideal is unattainable for most Second World countries in the near term. They are looking for the next best thing. 

Might Singapore be that next best thing? 

There are many models for many places at many times. And that's what the Second World is about. There's no one thing that links them all together. And that's okay. Let there be diversity as to what works in different societies, based on their size, wealth, demographics and geography. 

How did it go so wrong for America? 

Well, in the 1990s, US leaders were not successfully assertive in solving global problems, like not intervening to stop the Kosovo War. Then there was 9/11 and the West's response to it, and last year's financial crisis. 

So isn't this the end of American power as we know it? 

Just as there is no one time when the shoe is put on one foot, there's no time when the shoe is pulled off the foot - unless, of course, the US is instantly destroyed in a major war. 

THINK AGAIN 

'Many people want to see China replace the US or the East replace the West, and they believe that until that is complete, there is no transition (of power). That's nonsense.'

EARNEST yet soft-spoken, foreign policy scholar Parag Khanna has spent enough time in emerging markets to challenge what he considers to be simplistic views of how geopolitics really works these days: 

Black-and-white views of geopolitics 

'I don't deal in simplicities and I resent simplicities because they keep people stupid.' 
The reality of Asian power today 

'It doesn't matter any more whether or not President Barack Obama speaks longer than the Chinese and Indian leaders at the UN General Assembly.' 

America's position in the world today 

'Increasingly, it is no longer the case that the first thing a leader asks himself when he wakes up in the morning is 'What is the US president going to do today?'' 

Singapore 

'It embodies the notion of government as a science...and that is a good thing (for) healthy competition.' 

Why Singapore is great 

'The fact that everything always happens on time is quite a strength, I can tell you!' 

Why the Middle East is enamoured of China's growth model 

'The Arab countries go, 'The China model! The China model!' But what they mean is that they want economic liberalisation and growth without political liberalisation.' 

His almost three-year global trek for his book 

'A lot of people have told me that it is five books in one.' 

Why he wrote his book 

'Because people are speaking past one another.' 

Emerging markets 

'This phrase is actually quite silly because some emerging markets never emerge. I mean, China is a so-called emerging market but it is actually at the core of the global economy.' 

What about emerging markets surprises him the most 

'The extent to which they are forming connections among themselves. (That) circumvents our notion about a global core of central powers, unipolarity and hegemony.' 

Why it doesn't matter if emerging markets lack political heft 

'The test of whether or not they are pivotal (doesn't lie) in assuming the mantle of responsibility (but rather) in whether or not they lead in very important global sectors, such as oil production.' 

CHEONG SUK-WAI

<a href="http://meltwaternews.com/prerobot/sph.asp?pub=ST&sphurl=www.straitstimes.com//Review/Others/STIStory_463753.html">Link to article</a>]]>
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</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Best Business Books 2009: Globalization</title>
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   <published>2009-11-24T04:41:16Z</published>
   <updated>2009-11-26T12:54:18Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Strategy + Business | December 2009</summary>
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      &quot;Western Dominanance in Decline&quot;

By Ayesha Khanna and Parag Khanna

Ben Simpfendorfer
The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World Is Turning Away from the West and Rediscovering China 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

Nandan Nilekani
Imagining India: The Idea of a Renewed Nation 
(Penguin Press, 2009)

Nirmalya Kumar, with Pradipta K. Mohapatra and Suj Chandrasekhar
India’s Global Powerhouses: How They Are Taking On the World 
(Harvard Business Press, 2009)

Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat
The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing 
(Oxford University Press, 2009)

Robert P. Smith, with Peter Zheutlin
Riches among the Ruins: Adventures in the Dark Corners of the Global Economy 
(AMACOM, 2009)
      <![CDATA[The best books on globalization this year offer insights into three directional trends that are changing the topology of global trade and influence: the deepening of regional ties across emerging markets; the continuing rise of powerful new global players; and, finally, the intractability of risk factors inherent in emerging markets and regional networks, and how best to analyze them. Indeed, as the United States loses its hegemony as the primary engine of global growth, the new drivers of growth deserve intense examination.

New Ties That Bind

Traditionally, the West has myopically viewed globalization from the perspective of how its influence has spread eastward, but globalization also entails the deepening of economic, political, and demographic ties between any two regions, not just between the countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the rest of the world. The simultaneous rise of the economies of China and the Persian Gulf region, for example, is no coincidence. They are intimately connected and contributors to one another’s rising prosperity, as skillfully described in this year’s best book on globalization, Ben Simpfendorfer’s The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World Is Turning Away from the West and Rediscovering China.

Simpfendorfer, a Royal Bank of Scotland economist based in Hong Kong, has the unique vantage point of having worked in Damascus and Dubai, as well as in many countries in East Asia. He uses the southern Chinese city of Yiwu as a microcosm for the reopening of the Silk Road. Until recently an out-of-the-way village, Yiwu is a revealing node because its residents make their fortunes selling cheap “made in China” goods to the developing world, not to the U.S. and Europe.

Yiwu’s rise as a trade center — its annual trade fair drew 3 million visitors in 2007 — and the repaving of the Silk Road are due in part to the United States’ harsh response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Difficulties getting U.S. visas forced Arabs to take their business elsewhere at the very time they were amassing capital from high oil prices. The growing demand for oil from India and China provided a natural alternative, and Gulf-Asia trade burgeoned. Saudi Arabia’s oil exports to China hit US$31 billion in 2008, and China’s exports to the Arab world pulled even with those of the U.S. at about $50 billion, a trend embodied in the sprawling Dragon Mart on Dubai’s outskirts (the largest trading hub for Chinese goods outside the Chinese mainland) and Chinese car dealerships in Damascus.

This new Silk Road is not only slicked with oil, it is technologically enhanced through multilingual B2B websites such as Alibaba.com, which have dramatically lowered the costs of trade between the Persian Gulf and China. And it is reinforced by the migration of labor; at least 10,000 Chinese work on building oil terminals in Saudi Arabia on the coast of the Red Sea. This also means that 10,000 potentially idle young Saudi men are not working at oil terminals, something for which China may eventually suffer political blowback. But for now, China’s baggage in the Arab world remains very light, unlike the Gulf region’s conflicted relationships with the U.S. and other Western nations.

Shifts in trade are usually followed by shifts in finance, and here the evidence Simpfendorfer offers is equally revealing. Arab and Chinese businesses continue to court one another’s sovereign wealth funds, looking for capital infusions and building trust, while many U.S. companies and markets look more and more like dry holes. Even before the economic crisis struck in 2008, Gulf countries had begun a gradual shift of foreign exchange reserve holdings to euros, and the European Union is in the final stages of free-trade negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. China has also telegraphed its desire to diversify investments and currency reserves away from the U.S. dollar, in essence signaling a certain ideological unity with its new Arab partners.

The political ties on the new Silk Road are evident in the frequent reciprocal summits to which Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and China’s President Hu Jintao bring planes full of executives eager to sign deals. Oil trading, foreign investment, arms deals, and the rhetoric of diplomatic alignment are all part of the mutual reinforcing.

In using the Silk Road as a metaphor, Simpfendorfer reminds us that the trade networks between the Middle East and Asia date back centuries, illustrating how globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon either. He also points out that the Silk Road was in fact plural; it was many routes in multiple directions. Much like the new world order, it had no single center.

The New Silk Road is a window into the deepening commercial and cultural ties that define globalization outside the Western domain. English may be the necessary global language, but it’s insufficient to understand and capitalize on today’s multidirectional globalization. Simpfendorfer’s first-person observations plausibly sketch the many individual threads that will likely be woven together to create tomorrow’s geopolitical alliances.

India’s Bid for Economic Leadership

It is remarkable how in the past few years the analytical perspective on globalization has shifted from Westernization to the rise of two Asian giants. The literature on Asian globalization has also matured; the overly simplistic language of “Chindia” is gone, with each nation now being treated as a confident competitor in its own right — and it is India that has gained ground, at least in publishing-volume terms, over the past year.

After several years of almost outlandishly unrealistic portraits of India’s rise that glossed over its crumbling infrastructure, fractious politics, and impoverished masses, in Nandan Nilekani’s Imagining India: The Idea of a Renewed Nation, we finally have an inspiring yet balanced account that takes these challenges head on. Nilekani, the hero of Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), a former co-chairman of IT giant Infosys and now a cabinet minister in the Indian government, knows that for India to achieve global respectability, the success of firms like Infosys must spread to companies throughout India. As a CEO and statesman, he elegantly glides between national history, entrepreneurial autobiography, trend forecasting, and public policy — taking the attitude that “what’s good for India is good for Infosys” and focusing on how to improve access for all Indians to health, education, jobs, and infrastructure. (Also see Nilekani’s “India’s Demographic Moment,” s+b, Autumn 2009.)

Although so much of the talk about the Indian market opportunity revolves around the “bottom of the pyramid,” Nilekani wants to shrink the pyramid’s base by growing the middle class while also ensuring a dignified and sustainable life for those who are worse off. The twin foundations of this strategy are IT and the promotion of English-language education above all else. Exuding a confidence that rivals China’s pronouncements about its economic future, Nilekani states, “We can, first of all, reasonably assume that within a few years we should be able to have ubiquitous connectivity to cover every Indian home, hamlet and town.” Such ambition is coupled with a detailed strategy for harnessing an emerging demographic dividend created through the combination of economic growth and a boom in the number of working-age people. This will create tremendous business opportunities for foreign firms and Indian entrepreneurs alike, particularly in products such as low-cost computers and PDAs.

To realize this vision, Nilekani says, universities must be stripped of ideological dogmas and produce more experts in health care and alternative energy; informal and non-unionized labor must be empowered as service distributors; and more states must follow the business-friendly model of the state of Andhra Pradesh, which features India’s best highway system and emphasizes competition instead of subsidies.

The recent electoral victory of the Congress Party–led alliance ought to mean greater support for and confidence in India’s ability to establish more such zones of innovation. The India of the past, where entrepreneurs were considered “devious capitalists” and computers referred to as “job-eating machines,” is beginning to look like the U.S. of the 1990s, whereas Nilekani’s India of electronic ID cards and e-governance is proving to be a progressive experiment worthy of investors’ attention. After the book’s publication, Nilekani left Infosys to become chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India, a $6 billion smart-card project aimed at providing Indians with personal ID cards.

Where Nilekani champions India as a market destination, Nirmalya Kumar, Pradipta K. Mohapatra, and Suj Chandrasekhar focus on the nation’s growing status as a player in the global arena and the effect this will have on the next phase of globalization. Their book, India’s Global Powerhouses: How They Are Taking On the World, offers a deeper look at the way India’s major multinationals are pursuing globalization on their own terms. Kumar, a marketing professor at the London Business School, and his coauthors argue that these firms, which include the Birla and Tata groups, can leverage vast assets and tolerate high debt-to-equity ratios to complete international deals, such as Tata Steel’s 2006 acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steelmaker Corus and the 2007 merger that created ArcelorMittal, the world’s leading steelmaker.

Based on extensive interviews with deal makers in major Indian firms, the authors’ case for eventually seeing more Indian companies (as opposed to Chinese companies) among the top multinationals rests on arguments similar to those of Nilekani — namely that Indians’ command of the English language and comfort with diverse, multiethnic workforces result in relatively frictionless outbound acquisitions. The fact that outbound investment surpassed inbound investment for the first time in 2006, a major turning point for “Brand India,” lends credence to this reasoning. Further, they expect to see Indian companies competing globally in a greater variety of industries. Indeed, this well-selected set of cases, which includes Hindalco’s global aluminum empire and Suzlon’s international windpower supply chain, demonstrates that India has already branched out beyond IT and manufacturing, with biotech and other sectors certainly on the near horizon.

Both Imagining India and Global Powerhouses see India as a rival to China in the global arena, competitive thanks to its younger demographic profile, English proficiency, and higher-value finished goods. The fact that Indian companies have proven that they can pull off multibillion-dollar acquisitions overseas gives them an additional advantage. Many questions remain, however: Will India’s publicly traded companies be allowed to hold high levels of debt? What will happen when the country’s dominant family-owned model is confronted with international management practices — and scandals on the magnitude of Ramalinga Raju’s billion-dollar fraud at Satyam Computer Services? India has reached well beyond its borders, but a turbulent global economy means that there is no guarantee of smooth progress.

Risk and Reward in New Markets

Major Western firms, such as Coca-Cola and GM, have reported greater profits overseas than at home for almost a decade now, and global expansion into faster-growing economies seems essential to all First World companies that can afford it. But even though emerging and frontier markets, such as Sri Lanka and Romania, are undoubtedly the next major globalization story, they are volatile and unpredictable. Yet few companies take political risk seriously. Most either rely on experts and “insider advice” or simply ignore the subject as too complex and intangible to integrate with day-to-day strategy.

In this sense, Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat’s The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing is long overdue. The authors, both at the prestigious consulting firm Eurasia Group, draw on years of top-level advisory experience to provide the first accessible and rigorous treatment of political risk for business executives. “Fat tail” is a statistical term that refers to a bump at the end of a distribution curve where there is added risk, but the likelihood that a particular event will occur “appears so catastrophically damaging, unlikely to happen, and difficult to predict, that many of us choose to simply ignore it. Until it happens.” The authors’ main point: Black swans, as Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls them, can be political as well as financial.

Such is the volume’s tone as it takes the reader through a wide variety of events that wreaked havoc in capital markets, including the Russian ruble devaluation of 1998, the 2003 PDVSA oil strikes in Venezuela, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the passage of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in 2002. Indeed, as shown by the critical firestorm that forced state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company to withdraw its bid to acquire Unocal in the U.S. in 2005, local political sensitivities impact investments everywhere, even in the United States.

Bremmer and Keat turn the amorphous notion of risk into a catalog of former secretary of defense  Donald Rumsfeld’s oft-quoted “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns,” covering warfare, energy supply disruptions, terrorist attacks, coups and civil wars, expropriation and breaches of contract, currency controls and defaults, global warming and demographics, and, of course, corruption. Along the way they offer sensible resilience mechanisms to prepare for such events (e.g., risk mapping, data collection, scenario analysis), ensure continued operations (e.g., personnel location), and hedge strategic bets (e.g., joint ventures).

But lest we begin to believe that political risk is fully manageable, Robert P. Smith’s Riches among the Ruins: Adventures in the Dark Corners of the Global Economy (written with Peter Zheutlin) provides a stark reminder that “frontier markets” can be a euphemism for the chaotic Third World. Smith, the founder and managing director of the Turan Corporation, which specializes in emerging-market sovereign debt, takes us on a tour of places where he says you have to “hold on to your wallet and your life”: El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey, and Vietnam.

In the 1970s and ’80s, before dollarization and Bloomberg terminals, sovereign debt–trading middlemen like Smith relied on chutzpah and instinct to determine bond prices and find trusted money changers. For such financial swashbucklers, understanding people was as important as, if not more important than, understanding markets. Clearly, improvisation was Smith’s greatest gift: He carried large volumes of cash internationally, set up local holding companies to collect debts, and sent alias-named proxy lawyers to scout for contacts and information — anything to get the job done.

Even as the sovereign debt trade has grown into a $1.7 trillion industry conducted by multinational banks and investment firms, Smith’s characters are alive and well today, just dressed better and using BlackBerrys instead of rotary-dial telephones. After reading this book, one wonders how Arab and Chinese investors described by Simpfendorfer will treat the frontier markets of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that lie between them on the New Silk Road.

Smith witnessed every incident in The Fat Tail taxonomy, from arbitrary currency controls to coups to expropriations. His implicit reminder is that emerging markets are a long-term investment. It’s a reminder that would have been worth hearing in late 2008, when the worldwide flight of capital to safety caused foreign direct investment in the developing world to plummet. Many analysts threw the baby out with the bathwater, and the U.S. became the default market of choice even at near zero percent yield on Treasury securities. But, in fact, by April 2009, the Wall Street Journal was already reporting a surge in emerging market indexes. Growth had not gone negative, and foreign exchange reserves and high savings rates combined to restore stability.

This isn’t to say that recoveries are permanent. Smith’s description of Russia in 1997, when he and others bought in heavily on the assumption that Russia was too big to fail, inadvertently reminds us of Russia in 2007: too dependent on high oil prices and with weak regulations and enforcement. Just over a decade ago, the Russian stock market lost 75 percent of its value; in 2009, it has lost at least 60 percent. Emerging markets can always submerge again.

In the evolution from Smith’s boots-on-the-ground adventures to Bremmer and Keat’s more detached, methodological approach, an interesting mutual appreciation appears: Smith thinks that his adventurous tactics are no longer relevant in a world of real-time, electronic information, yet Bremmer and Keat argue that local political knowledge is still essential to staying ahead of the curve. In other words, paying more attention to data is not enough — good instincts are also essential to figuring out all the unknowns.

A Warning to Established Players

An unmistakable conclusion that we share with all the books featured in this essay is the assertion that the U.S. has lost its status as the preeminent driver of globalization. Thus, we predict that two trends will typify the next phase of globalization: First, stronger regionalism in terms of deepening economic integration in areas such as East Asia, Latin America, and the Arab world will be driven by local powers such as China, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. Second, the global playing field for firms, capital, and strategies will become much more level as Western companies lose the automatic edge they once held in trust and credibility. (See “Capturing the Asian Opportunity,” by Andrew Cainey, Suvojoy Sengupta, and Steven Veldhoen, s+b, Winter 2009.) Companies in emerging and frontier markets may not become global leaders in their own right, but they will surely be powerful players in their own domains and beyond. 

Ayesha Khanna is managing director of Hybrid Realities, a research and strategy consulting firm, and author of Straight Through Processing for Financial Services: The Complete Guide (Elsevier, 2008).

Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and author of The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century (Random House, 2009).

<a href="http://www.strategy-business.com/article/09407d?gko=97056-27802017-29169361">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Energizing Peace</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/11/energizing_peace.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.182</id>
   
   <published>2009-11-06T03:34:50Z</published>
   <updated>2009-11-06T03:37:55Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Foreign Policy | November 5, 2009</summary>
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      By Saleem Ali and Parag Khanna

Natural gas pipelines, not military supply lines, could pave the way for stability in power-starved Central Asia.
      <![CDATA[
The lessons of geography appear to be ignored by policymakers in Washington D.C. these days. The Obama administration is pursuing tenuous negotiations with Iran regarding its supply of low-enriched uranium, in the hopes of taking the first step to erase the longstanding animosity between the two countries. It is also rethinking its Afghanistan and Pakistan policy to emphasize reconstruction and economic development. These two strategies are unfortunately disconnected -- despite the fact that Afghanistan shares a 600-mile-long strategic border with Iran.

Neither a "surge" of troops and aid in Afghanistan, nor negotiations over Iran's nuclear program without addressing its regional isolation, will bring Central Asia much closer to stability. The United States must support a policy that addresses the major deficiency all these countries share in common: a lack of clean, affordable energy for their poor populations. Only natural gas pipelines, not military supply lines, can do this. 

The United States has so far been ambivalent about using Central Asia's natural resources to guide its policy, confounding the prospects for pipeline development. Yet without an energy infrastructure, individual U.S. reconstruction programs are going to struggle to get off the ground. For example, the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) established in Pakistan's tribal areas, which provide goods produced in these areas with duty-free access to the U.S. market, will have little impact without a steady energy supply to fuel local industry. Pipelines and power lines can be a much more significant economic stimulus. By providing energy for power-starved nations, they can empower microeconomic activity through lower fuel and electricity costs.

Natural gas pipelines can also provide an impetus for a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. Two proposed pipeline routes currently offer the greatest opportunity to solidify regional integration and create lasting stability: the route from Iran via Pakistan to India (IPI), and from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan to India (TAPI). But thus far, the U.S. had sought to hinder international commerce with Iran, lobbying only for pipeline routes that avoid Iranian territory. It actively lobbied against the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project - even despite its tacit acceptance of the pipeline that runs between Iran and Turkey. This Iran-Turkey pipeline, which traverses Turkey's volatile Kurdish region, also exemplifies how security along such infrastructure can be adequately provided, even in conflict zones.

The IPI pipeline might represent the most promising confidence-building measure with Iran. Furthermore, recent discussions surrounding TAPI actually route it through Iran as well. If this turns out to be the case, it will force the U.S. to accept that the stabilization of Pakistan and Afghanistan requires a rapprochement with Iran. Since demand for gas in South Asia continues to skyrocket, the U.S. should encourage both projects and actively link their implementation to its conflict resolution strategy for the region. Détente with Iran need not wait for a nuclear breakthrough.

Furthermore, depending on the route of the pipeline, Afghanistan could earn as much as $100 million per year from transit fees of pipelines, providing a necessary boost for Afghanistan's perpetually aid-dependent government. These pipelines will aid, not hinder, America's efforts to provide economic relief to Pakistan as well. Even with the fairly high prices for gas Iran offers to Pakistan, IPI could save the country between $652 million and $1.17 billion annually, depending on the price of oil.  This is approximately the same amount as the Kerry-Lugar legislation would deliver in non-military aid each year to Pakistan. According to government reports, Pakistan currently has an energy shortfall of between 3000 and 4000 megawatts (MW), while India's shortfall is estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000 MW. For this reason, the development of energy projects were a focus of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Islamabad - however, the talks reportedly ignored the regional context of this issue. 

Finally, given concerns about climate change, natural gas pipelines offer donors an opportunity to limit the output of carbon emissions. Natural gas is likely to be the cleanest and most cost-effective fuel to meet Pakistan and India's energy shortfall. Apart from its use in power plants, natural gas is also being used in the transportation sector. The significance of compressed natural gas (CNG) in India was highlighted as early as 1998, when the Supreme Court ruled that all commercial vehicles in New Delhi should switch to natural gas by 2001 due to pollution concerns from diesel and petrol engines. Pakistan already has more than a million cars on CNG and ranks third in global CNG use after Brazil and Argentina. What's more, while oil is still largely transported across the globe by a fleet of more than 38,000 pollution-causing marine tankers, 93% of the world's gas continues to be supplied through pipelines.

Natural gas development offers a unique opportunity to tackle strategic, diplomatic, and environmental goals at the same time. Even in the world's most turbulent region, there is a possibility for renewed trade along what ancient merchants knew as the Silk Road.

If we genuinely want to stabilize this crisis zone without a heavy American footprint, new energy-based Silk Roads are the solution.

<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/05/energizing_peace">Link to article</a>
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</entry>
<entry>
   <title>Grüne Rhetorik, graue Realität</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/11/grune_rhetorik_graue_realitat.html" />
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   <published>2009-11-01T22:03:01Z</published>
   <updated>2009-11-01T22:07:15Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Sueddeutsche Zeitung | October 30, 2009</summary>
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      By Parag Khanna

Klimaschutz hat bei den Amerikanern keine Top-Priorität. Europa sollte nicht auf die Klimaschutz-Nachzügler warten - sondern vorangehen. 
      <![CDATA[In der Theorie ist sich der Westen einig, aber die Praxis ist eine andere Sache. Präsident Obama hört sich stets sehr europäisch an, wenn er ernsthafte Kontrollen sowie eine Regulierung der Kohlendioxid-Emissionen in der US-Industrie verlangt. Zu seinen wichtigsten Themen im Wahlkampf gehörte der langfristige Umbau der konventionellen Wirtschaft zu einer grünen.

Aber vielleicht ist das Schicksal von Van Jones, Obamas Umweltberater, eine geeignete Metapher, um die amerikanische Politik von heute zu beschreiben. Jones, ein anerkannt erfolgreicher Umweltaktivist aus San Francisco, hatte gerade im Weißen Haus angefangen, da zitierten Republikaner aus Aufrufen, die er vor einigen Jahren mal unterschrieben hatte. Darin verlangte Jones eine Untersuchung, ob US-Offizielle möglicherweise vor dem 11. September 2001 von den Terrorangriffen wussten. Jones wurde zum Rücktritt gezwungen.

Unterschiedliche Psychologie in Amerika und Europa

Theoretisch möchte Amerika unter Obama den Weg der Nachhaltigkeit weiter fortsetzen. Realität jedoch ist, dass den Amerikanern ein Abkommen in Kopenhagen nur wenig mehr bedeutet als das von Kyoto - welches Amerika ja niemals ratifiziert hat. 

Die unterschiedliche Psychologie in Amerika und Europa lässt sich am besten mit einem Blick auf die Prioritäten erklären. Während die europäischen Staaten hoch verschuldet sind, verfügen sie zumindest über eine solide Infrastruktur und ein allgemeines Gesundheitswesen. In Amerika dagegen tobt gerade eine leidenschaftliche Debatte, ob demjenigen Viertel der Bevölkerung, das bisher überhaupt keine Gesundheitsversorgung hat, eine solche nun zur Verfügung gestellt werden soll - während sich das Land zugleich mit einer in großem Umfang verfallenden Infrastruktur plagt. In solch einem Umfeld hat Klimawandel einfach keine Top-Priorität.

Umweltbedrohungen nicht im Bewusstsein verankert

Amerikaner leben im Heute: Ein paar Monate ist es erst her, dass ihre Sparquote zum ersten Mal seit vielen Jahren wieder oberhalb von null lag. Und der Klimawandel gilt hier als eine Herausforderung von morgen. Warum einen Aufschlag auf Treibstoff - die ruchlose Benzinsteuer -, obwohl der Welt das Öl doch noch lange nicht ausgeht? Eine Nation von Pionieren, die immer von allem mehr als genug hatte und der es immer noch an landesweiten Vorschriften für so grundlegende Dinge wie Recycling mangelt - eine solche Nation ist vielleicht die letzte, die eine Bedrohung wie den Klimawandel im allgemeinen Bewusstsein verankert.

Nach Meinung vieler Europäer wird die Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen das wichtigste Gipfeltreffen in der Geschichte der Menschheit sein - aber dort wird es die Weltgemeinschaft sein, die scheitert, nicht bloß Amerika. Man erinnere sich, wie der indische Umweltminister Jairam Ramesh während seines Besuchs in Washington im September unverblümt erklärte, in Kopenhagen keine Wunder zu erwarten. Ja, er hat sogar betont, ein Schwellenland wie Indien werde zumindest bis zum Jahr 2020 keine Maßnahmen ergreifen, die das Wirtschaftswachstum bremsen würden. Bereits beim Kyoto-Protokoll machten Länder wie Brasilien, Indien und China nicht mit. Das Problem ist: In Kopenhagen wird es jedoch auf genau diese Länder ankommen. Die Emissionsmengen dieser aufstrebenden Länder erreichen inzwischen westliches Niveau. 

Nicht auf Klimaschutz-Nachzügler warten

Kann man jetzt anhand des Prinzips "Der Verschmutzer zahlt" moralisieren oder aber vom Westen eine Art historischen Schadenersatz verlangen? Wer das versucht, der macht aus Kopenhagen nur eine Umweltversion der UN-Anti-Rassismus-Konferenz (die von mehreren Ländern für antisemitische Anstöße missbraucht wurde).

Vor diesem Hintergrund verblüfft weniger die uninspirierte Herangehensweise Amerikas an das Thema, als vielmehr die Frage, warum eigentlich hier jedes Land auf der Welt auf Amerikas Führung wartet. Der Punkt dabei ist nicht, dass der Beitrag, den Amerika zum Emissionsabbau leistet, global gesehen, entscheidend sein wird. Das ist unbestritten. Doch sollte der Rest der Welt bitte keine Zeit verlieren, sondern vorangehen. 

Zugegeben, die Europäische Union tat dies vor Jahren schon einmal, indem sie trotz der amerikanischen Schwafeleien eigene Regulierungen nach dem Kyoto-Prinzip einführte. Es ist in der Klimakrise ähnlich wie bei der Finanzkrise: Niemand sollte erwarten, dass ausgerechnet der Chefarchitekt des Desasters die global wirkende Arznei bereitstellt.

Vielleicht können die Unterschiede zwischen Amerika und Europa ja auch eine Quelle der Stärke sein. US-Firmen legen weniger Wert auf staatliche Anreize, umweltfreundlich zu produzieren (das ist eher der europäische Ansatz) - dafür aber umso mehr auf Anreize des Marktes, saubere Technologien einzuführen. Daran arbeiten sie, jede Firma für sich. 

Ein Netz von Aufladestationen

Ein schönes Beispiel dafür ist das Unternehmen "Better Place" des früheren SAP-Managers Shai Agassi: Seine Batterie-Innovationen tragen dazu bei, Elektroautos in Kalifornien populär zu machen (einem Bundesstaat, der, für sich genommen, zu den zehn größten Volkswirtschaften der Welt gehört). Eine solche Firma hat natürlich ein wachsendes Interesse daran, entlang der Autobahnen ein Netz von Aufladestationen hochzuziehen. 

Darüber hinaus gibt es gemeinnützige Organisationen wie die "Joint US-China Cooperation on Clean Energy" - eine Initiative, bei der mehr passiert, als es in Kopenhagen je der Fall sein wird. Jeden Monat bringt sie Dutzende amerikanische Firmen nach China, wo deren Manager dann Bezirks-Gouverneure und Bürgermeister treffen. Mit denen arbeiten sie daran, Chinas Ausstoß an Kohlendioxid zu reduzieren, und dies jeweils um die Emissionsmengen einer Mega-Stadt. Und US-Firmen wie Cisco und IBM sind weltweit an Stadtplanungen beteiligt, von Hamburg bis Bangalore.

Blick auf die Substanz von Innovationen

Letztlich werden diese Innovationen ihren Weg zurück auf den US-Markt finden. Auf diese Weise leisten sie einen großen Beitrag dazu, auch den US-Ausstoß zu reduzieren. Die Schlüsselerkenntnis sowohl für Amerikaner wie für Europäer wird dann sein, dass Klimawandel von unten mindestens genauso effizient bekämpft werden kann wie von oben. 

Kopenhagen wird kommen und gehen, wie Kyoto. Wir sollten den Blick viel stärker auf die Substanz von Innovationen richten, anstatt auf die Rhetorik irgendwelcher Deklarationen. Diese Lektion sollten sich alle Diplomaten und alle Unterhändler zu Herzen nehmen, ganz gleich, ob sie es mit dem Klimawandel, den Finanzmärkten, der Armut in Afrika oder irgendeiner anderen Herausforderung zu tun bekommen.

<a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/554/492907/text/">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Analyzing Libya</title>
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   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.180</id>
   
   <published>2009-10-28T13:11:40Z</published>
   <updated>2009-10-28T13:13:09Z</updated>
   
   <summary>International Relations and Security Network | October 27, 2009</summary>
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      <![CDATA[
<a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Podcasts/Detail/?lng=en&id=108928">Click here to hear interview</a>]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Profile in Poder Magazine</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/10/profile_in_poder_magazine.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.179</id>
   
   <published>2009-10-20T17:17:47Z</published>
   <updated>2009-10-20T17:20:46Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Poder | October 2009</summary>
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      <![CDATA[By Dolia Estevez

<a href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/Interview%20with%20Poder%20Mexico%20-%20October%202009.pdf">Download article</a>
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<entry>
   <title>Profile in Oriental Morning Post</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/10/profile_in_oriental_morning_po.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.178</id>
   
   <published>2009-10-19T14:42:12Z</published>
   <updated>2009-10-19T14:46:01Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Oriental Morning Post | October 19, 2009</summary>
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      <![CDATA[Interview with Yida Ma


<a href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/Oriental%20Morning%20Post%20interview%20-%20October%202009.pdf">Download file</a>

<a href="http://www.dfdaily.com/node2/node23/node102/userobject1ai193769.shtml">Link to article</a>]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>&quot;USA sind nicht alleinige Weltmacht&quot;</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/10/usa_sind_nicht_alleinige_weltm.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.177</id>
   
   <published>2009-10-16T19:06:44Z</published>
   <updated>2009-10-16T19:09:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Wiener Zeitung | October 16, 2009</summary>
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      Von Klaus Huhold

US-Experte sieht Konkurrenz durch EU und China.
      <![CDATA[Wien. 

Nach dem Untergang der Sowjetunion wurde lauthals das Zeitalter der USA als einziger Supermacht auf dem Globus verkündet. Heute, etwa 20 Jahre danach, trifft dieser Befund auf keinen Fall zu, meint Parag Khanna. Der Politikforscher des US-Thinktanks "New America Foundation" zählt China und die EU ebenso zu den Weltmächten.

Für seine Analyse nennt Khanna wirtschaftliche Gründe. "Um eine Supermacht zu sein, muss man eine global einflussreiche Wirtschaft haben. Und Europa verfügt über 25 Prozent der Weltwirtschaft, die USA auch, und Chinas Anteil wächst und beträgt jetzt schon um die 15, 16 Prozent", sagt der renommierte Buchautor bei einem Hintergrundgespräch mit österreichischen Journalisten.

Doch was macht eine Supermacht sonst noch aus? "Supermacht zu sein heißt, weltweit einflussreich zu sein, Allianzen aufgebaut zu haben, Einfluss auf die Politik und Wirtschaft in allen globalen Regionen zu haben", betont der Experte für internationale Beziehungen.

Teilweise konkurrieren daher die USA, China und die EU schon heftig, teilweise gibt es Allianzen (etwa zwischen EU und USA in der Iran-Frage).

Jedenfalls ergibt sich aus dieser Konstellation "ein geopolitischer Markt", sagt Khanna. Er nannte bei einem Vortrag vor dem "Österreichischen Institut für Internationale Politik" Südamerika als Beispiel. Auch wenn die Vereinigten Staaten dort noch viel Einfluss haben, ist Südamerika schon lange nicht mehr Washingtons Hinterhof. Europa macht dort immer mehr Geschäfte, und es gibt bereits eine strategische Partnerschaft zwischen Brasilien und China.

Generell sorgt das Erstarken von China für neue Realitäten. Länder wie Kuba oder Nordkorea, die von den USA als Schurkenstaaten bezeichnet werden, werden von China strategisch, finanziell und militärisch unterstützt. Dies sei kein Zufall, betont Khanna, sondern ein Beleg für eine indirekte globale Konkurrenz.

<a href="http://www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=4103&Alias=wzo&cob=444779">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>&quot;Machtverlust der USA ist unwiderruflich&quot;</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/10/machtverlust_der_usa_ist_unwid.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.176</id>
   
   <published>2009-10-16T19:02:03Z</published>
   <updated>2009-10-16T19:05:35Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Die Presse | October 15, 2009</summary>
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      von CHRISTIAN ULTSCH

US-Politologe Parag Khanna sieht neue tripolare Welt mit China und starker EU. Der relative Machtverlust der USA sei eben strukturell bedingt und unwiderruflich. 
      <![CDATA[WIEN.

Für Parag Khanna, den Shootingstar unter den US-Politologen, sieht die Welt so aus: Die Ära der amerikanischen Dominanz ist vorbei. Es bilden sich zwei weitere Pole heraus: China – und auch Europa. Khanna gehört zu jenen, die das Einigungswerk der EU von außen bestaunen. In Wien sprach der erst 32-jährige indischstämmige Buchautor („Kampf um die zweite Welt“) und Experte der US-Denkfabrik New America Foundation vor Journalisten in fließendem Deutsch von einer „negativen Besessenheit“, mit der sich Europa im öffentlichen Diskurs abwerte.

Der Alte Kontinent trage ebenso wie die USA zu einem Viertel der Weltproduktion bei, wobei der US-Anteil leicht rückläufig sei und China (15 bis 16 Prozent) mit Riesenschritten aufhole. Die außenpolitische Uneinigkeit Europas sei nicht immer ein Nachteil, weil sie Raum für einzelstaatliche Initiativen lasse, so Khanna.

US-Präsident Obama habe die neue multipolare Welt akzeptiert, doch die USA hätten dennoch nicht an Einfluss gewonnen. Die Außenpolitik Chinas oder Indiens habe sich seit der Wahl Obamas nicht geändert. Der relative Machtverlust der USA sei eben strukturell bedingt und unwiderruflich. Zu erkennen sei das auch daran, dass der Dollar an Wert verliere und als Leitwährung infrage gestellt werde, behauptete Khanna, den das Österreichische Institut für Internationale Politik anlässlich seines 30-jährigen Jubiläums eingeladen hatte.

Wohin tendiert die Zweite Welt?

Essenziell für die Balance der drei Weltmächte sei, auf welche Seite sich die Zweite Welt – Indien oder Brasilien – schlage. China versuche seit der Finanzkrise mehr denn je, Allianzen mit Milliardeninvestitionen zu kaufen. Und trotzdem habe es immer noch genug Reserven, um seine Wirtschaft mit gigantischen Konjunkturpaketen auf Trab zu halten. Längst habe das chinesische Modell des autoritären Kapitalismus Nachahmer gefunden, erfolgreich umgesetzt sei es aber noch nirgendwo anders geworden.

Russland zählt der Experte nicht mehr zu den Supermächten, es sei dafür sowohl wirtschaftlich als auch demografisch zu schwach. Wie die Türkei werde Russland aber allein wegen seiner geografischen Lage eine Zwischenmacht mit Brückenfunktion bleiben.

Militärische Überlegenheit ist für Khanna kein entscheidendes Kriterium mehr. Diese Lektion sei den USA im Irak und in Afghanistan erteilt worden.

<a href="http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/515356/index.do?from=suche.intern.portal">Link to article</a>]]>
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<entry>
   <title>Vorbild Europaeische Union</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.paragkhanna.com/2009/09/vorbild_europaeische_union.html" />
   <id>tag:www.paragkhanna.com,2009://1.175</id>
   
   <published>2009-09-30T20:03:14Z</published>
   <updated>2009-09-30T20:05:28Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The European | October 1, 2009</summary>
   <author>
      <name></name>
      
   </author>
         <category term="Non-English Press" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.paragkhanna.com/">
      Dank Europa bewegt sich die Welt auf ein neues Mittelalter zu. Doch dieses Mal sind die Aussichten alles andere als düster.
      <![CDATA[“Es gibt kein Europa, es gibt nur Europäisierung.” Mit diesen Worten haben zwei Politikwissenschaftler nicht nur die aktuelle Dynamik innerhalb Europas treffend beschrieben, sondern auch eine Strategie für die Supermächte des 21. Jahrhunderts vorgezeichnet. Wir bewegen uns auf ein neues Mittelalter zu – eine Zeit der vielschichtigen und vielköpfigen Regierungsformen. Europa hat diese Lebensart erfunden und bietet sich jetzt wieder als Modell derselben an. Genauso wie vor Jahrhunderten ist Europa auch heute eine bunte Ansammlung von Städten, Regionen, Staaten, Gewerkschaften, Unternehmen, Parlamenten, Kommissionen, Gerichten und Armeen. Doch dieses Mal sind alle Teil des gleichen politischen und judikativen Raumes, sie haben eine gemeinsame Währung und eine übereinstimmende Vision. In einer Welt, in der konkrete Orte leicht zu Angriffszielen werden, ist Europa mit dieser Besinnung auf Räume und Ideen gut bedient.

Doch noch sind wir nicht in dieser Zukunft angekommen. Die aktuellen europäischen Entscheider sind gefangen in kurzsichtigen Debatten über Verfassungsfragen und Machtverteilungen zwischen neuen und alten Mitgliedern. Sie sollten sich stattdessen auf Erprobtes besinnen: Strategien, die Ost und West näher zueinander bringen (durch höhere Wachstumsraten in Osteuropa) und Demokratisierung (die zunehmend unter den neuen Mitgliedern starken Anklang findet). Um es anders auszudrücken: Auf den zweiten Blick hat die Expansion Europas viele Vorteile. Nicht zuletzt wird die demografische Entwicklung Europas durch die Integration von einhundert Millionen arbeitenden Menschen in den Wirtschaftsraum teilweise aufgewogen.

Es mag klischeehaft klingen, doch Europas Erfolgsgarantie ist die Selbstwahrnehmung als “softe” Superpower. Bereits heute sind die Grenzgebiete der EU in Nordafrika, der Türkei und Russland durch Handelsexporte und ausländische Investitionen zu mehr als zwei Dritteln von Europa abhängig. Gleichzeitig bieten diese Regionen die Energiereserven, die Europa in den kommenden Jahrzehnten benötigen wird. Diese Entwicklung wurde nicht durch den Barcelona-Prozess ausgelöst – und schon gar nicht durch die komplizierten Gespräche mit der Türkei. Die Ursache ist an anderer Stelle zu suchen: Europas Geografie ist gleichzeitig Europas Schicksal; und die EU hat genügend monetäre Macht, um die Spielregeln dieser Entwicklung zu bestimmen.

Das U.S. National Intelligence Council hat den Erfolg Europas bereits akzeptiert. Im “2020 Report”, einer Prognose der weltpolitischen Dynamik des kommenden Jahrzehnts, schreibt das Council: “Europas Stärke liegt darin, Vorbild zu sein für Modelle der globalen und regionalen Regierungsführung. Die EU wird von der NATO die Rolle der europäischen Leitinstitution übernehmen und gleichzeitig die Rolle der Europäer auf der globalen Bühne definieren.” Auf dem diesjährigen Weltwirtschaftsforum in Davos haben sowohl chinesische als auch amerikanische Delegierte darauf gedrängt, sich mehr am europäischen Modell zu orientieren. Obamas Pläne zur Reduktion von klimaschädlichen Emissionen sind ebenfalls “in Europa gemacht.” Die Verbreitung der Demokratie durch eine Stärkung transparenter Regierungsformen – auch das ist der Europäische Weg. Und in Lateinamerika, Ostasien und sogar in Afrika werden europäische Formen von grenzüberschreitendem Handel und Investitionen kopiert.

Die EU wird oftmals zerredet und zur Initiative aufgefordert. In Wahrheit müssen die Europäer nur an bereits bestehenden Praktiken weiterarbeiten.


<a href="http://www.theeuropean.de/parag-khanna/die-softe-supermacht">Link to article</a>]]>
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